The “Code Adjudicator” model: The Pubs Code, statutory arbitration and the tied lease by Meers, Jed & Hind, Liz
This is a repository copy of The “Code Adjudicator” model: The Pubs Code, statutory 
arbitration and the tied lease.




Meers, Jed orcid.org/0000-0001-7993-3062 and Hind, Liz (Accepted: 2021) The “Code 
Adjudicator” model: The Pubs Code, statutory arbitration and the tied lease. Legal Studies.




This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Forthcoming, Legal Studies 
1 
 
Forthcoming in Legal Studies 
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The “code adjudicator” is a new statutory intervention in business-to-business 
disputes. They are Janus-faced, combining a statutory arbitration function with a 
regulatory remit. This paper is a detailed critique of the “Pubs Code Adjudicator”, 
which presides over the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 and intervenes in the 
contractual relationships between the largest pub-owning companies and their tied-
tenants. Drawing on a sample of interviews with affected tenants, arbitration data, 
and legal appeals under the Arbitration Act 1996, we argue that – although these 
“new intermediaries” show promise – there are a series of limitations with both the 
function of the Pubs Code Regulations and the “code adjudicator” model itself. In 
particular, our findings demonstrate the use of delaying tactics, the interaction of 
code adjudication with the parties’ existing contractual relationships, and issues 
with the application of arbitration “burden of proof” standards to the exercise of 
duties under the statutory code. 
Keywords: Statutory arbitration, code adjudicator, tied leases, small businesses, 
landlord and tenant, dispute resolution. 
 
Introduction 
In the last ten years, a new model of business-to-business statutory arbitration has emerged: the “code 
adjudicator”. These are Janus-faced government appointees combining, as Hodges puts it, “elements of 
dispute resolution and of public quasi-regulatory authority.”1 On the one hand, they discharge a 
statutory arbitration role in contractual disputes between regulated parties governed under s.94 
Arbitration Act 1996. On the other, they discharge a regulatory role investigating compliance with a 
statutory code, bolstered with a power to issue sizable fines for breaches. The first of their kind are in 
the UK. The Groceries Code Adjudicator deals with contractual disputes between the largest 
supermarkets and their suppliers, and the Pubs Code Adjudicator deals with disputes between the largest 
pub-owning companies and their tied-tenants.2 Modelled on these two entities, others have called for 
 
*York Law School, University of York, UK. 
1 C Hodges, Delivering Dispute Resolution: A Holistic Review of Models in England and Wales (Hart 2019) p 
541. 
2 See Groceries Code Adjudicator, ‘About Us’ (Gov.uk, 2021). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/groceries-code-adjudicator/about [accessed 29th June 2021]; and 
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“code adjudicators” to preside over dealings between landowners and mobile or broadband network 
operators,3 between small businesses and digital platforms such as Amazon and Google,4 to enforce 
codes of conduct in the energy sector,5 or – as raised recently in the House of Commons – for a “Garment 
Code Adjudicator” to “to reduce exploitation in the UK’s garment industry”.6 These “new 
intermediaries”7 in business-to-business dispute resolution are a much touted solution for regulators 
faced with large businesses exploiting their power over small businesses. 
This paper is a detailed critique of the most active of the “code adjudicators”: the “Pubs Code 
Adjudicator” (PCA), established under the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 and 
presiding over the Pubs Code Regulations 2016. Drawing on a database of arbitration decisions, data 
on the exercise of code rights, interviews with affected tenants and legal analysis of referrals to the High 
Court under s.68 and s.69 Arbitration Act 1996,8 we argue that the PCA and the operation of the Pubs 
Code Regulations 2016 suffers from a series of limitations, reflecting both shortfalls in their 
underpinning regulations and broader issues that arise in the “code adjudicator” model. In particular, 
we highlight problems of delaying tactics, “burden of proof” standards, and interactions with prior legal 
relationships (in this case, that of a landlord and tenant). Fundamentally, as Hodges’ argues, any model 
of dispute resolution has two core objectives: (i) to identify problems and resolve them, and (ii) to 
change future behaviour or systems based on problems its users encounter.9 We argue that the current 
operation of the PCA and the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 currently fails on both counts, offering 
lessons for both the design and powers of the PCA and the “code adjudicator” model more broadly. 
The argument is in three sections. First, we provide an outline of the longstanding problem that the 
creation of the PCA was designed to address – the vertical integration of “tied pub” businesses and the 
resulting power imbalance between large pub-owning businesses (PubCos) and their tied leaseholders. 
It is not possible to understand the development and current operation of the Pubs Code Regulations 
without understanding how the sector has developed and previous attempts at legislative intervention. 
This section draws on archival research – all references to archival material derive from records held in 
the National Archive, Kew, London. Second, we provide a precis of the PCA’s powers and 
 
Pubs Code Adjudicator, ‘About Us’ (Gov.uk, 2021). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/pubs-code-adjudicator/about [accessed 29th June 2021]. 
3 Such as a proposed amendment to the Digital Economy Act 2017 to introduce a code adjudicator to preside 
over the Electronic Communications Code HL Deb, 22 February 2017, c361.  
4 C Pike, ‘Lines of Business Restrictions’ (2020) OECD Competition Papers, Available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3594412 [accessed 29th June 2021] p 22. 
5 Energy Policy Group, ‘Codes Governance and Reform Discussion Paper’ (University of Exeter 2017) 
Available at: http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Energy-Codes-Discussion-Note-
Nov-2015-updated.pdf [accessed 29th June 2021]. 
6 HC Deb, 23 March 2021, cW, UIN 169085. 
7 Hodges, above n 1. pp 450-456. 
8 Star Pubs & Bars Ltd v McGrath [2021] EWHC 1640 (Ch); Ei Group Plc v Clarke [2020] EWHC 1858 (Ch);  
Punch Partnerships (PTL) Ltd v Jonalt Ltd [2020] EWHC 1376 (Ch); Punch Parterships (Ptl) Ltd v 
Highwayman Hotel (Kidlington) Ltd [2020] EWHC 714 (Ch). 
9 Ibid p 29. 
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underpinning regulations. Third, drawing on arbitration data, interviews with affected tenants and legal 
analysis of appeals under the Arbitration Act 1996, we argue that this case study of the PCA reveals 
significant shortcomings in both the current design and operation of the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 
and the “code adjudicator” model more broadly. 
 
1. TIED PUBS AS A REGULATORY TARGET 
Though often discussed with misty-eyed references to “English cultural history”10 or their “magic and 
majesty”11,  public houses are longstanding legal battlegrounds. This is especially true of pubs operating 
under the “beer tie” model, accounting for nearly half of the UK’s approximately 45,000 establishments. 
This tied model has been central to the pub sector across several European countries since at least the 
19th century,  imposing obligations on the leaseholders (the pub landlords, often also living in the 
property) and securing a route-to-market for the freeholders, traditionally the breweries themselves and 
more recently the modern “Pub Owning Company” (PubCo).12 
The proposition is simple: in return for reduced rent and business support, the tied tenant’s procurement 
is constrained under the lease through a contractual arrangement of exclusive supply. These restrictions 
on procurement – known as the “wet rent” – require the tenant to purchase beer and often wines, spirits, 
soft drinks and other supplies from the owner of the establishment. These products are provided at a 
higher-than-market cost, with the Office for Fair Trading estimating that in the UK the price of beer is 
on average 30% higher under a tie (with other organisations arguing the differential is far higher),13 and 
restrict the tied tenant’s purchasing power to a finite list of PubCo approved products. 
This “beer tie” model is defined by two features. First, there is a “risk transfer” between the pub owning 
company and the tied tenant. 14 The cheaper “dry” rent on the property, offset against the “wet” rent on 
constrained procurement, is ordinarily calculated in line with the estimated turnover a competent 
publican can fashion, known as the “fair maintainable trade”. The rent in the lease reflects a division of 
estimated profits – known as the “divisible balance” – ordinarily in the region of 65% to the PubCo and 
35% to the tied tenant. For the tied tenant, the estimated turnover is therefore baked into their rent: they 
 
10 C Markham and G Bosworth, ‘The Village Pub in the Twenty-First Century: Embeddedness and the “Local”’ 
in I Cabras, D Higgins & D Preece (eds), Brewing, Beer and Pubs: A Global Perspective (Palgrave 2016) 266–
281, p 266. 
11 J Boak and R Bailey, 20th Century Pub (Homewood Press 2017) p 7. 
12 K Deconinck and J Swinnen , ‘Tied Houses: Why They Are So Common and Why Breweries Charge Them 
High Prices for Their Beer’ in I Cabras, D Higgins & D Preece (eds), Brewing, Beer and Pubs: A Global 
Perspective (Palgrave 2016) 231–246. 
13 Office of Fair Trading, ‘CAMRA super-complaint – OFT final decision’ (2010) Available at: 
https://tinyurl.com/y8hvuwqg [accessed 29th June 2021] at 120. 
14  D. Higgins, S. Toms and M. Uddin, ‘Vertical monopoly power, profit and risk: The British Beer Industry, 
c.1970-c.2004’ in Iganzio Cabras and David Higgins (eds), The History of the Beer and Brewing Industry 
(Routledge 2017) 99-126, p 103. 
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carry the risks of failing to meet the PubCo projections. Tenants who over-perform these estimates buy 
more tied beer, and as a result pay more “wet” rent to the PubCo. This is perhaps reflected in differential 
earnings between tied publicans and their non-tied counterparts. The IPPR have found that 46% of tied 
publications earn less than £15,000 per year – more than double the rate for non-tied publicans.15  
Second, in addition to providing a notionally cheaper “dry” rent, PubCos argue that tied tenants have 
access to the valuable provision of business services and advice. In a competition law sense, these are 
“special commercial or financial advantages”, such as training, public relations provision, marketing 
and business advice.16 This is more than just business acumen: a fundamental principle of competition 
law within such vertically integrated models is that exclusive purchasing obligations are offset by 
countervailing benefits.17 The vertical integration of the tied model has been subject to a series of 
references by brewers to the EU Commission which have dealt specifically with this issue, concluding 
that such ties can be “more than offset by quantifiable countervailing benefits”.18 The usefulness of 
these commercial and financial advantages – especially when set against the comparative high costs of 
the “wet” rent – has been criticized by campaigning organisations and tied publicans.19 
a. Failed regulatory interventions 
This vertical integration of production and supply is evergreen in the British pub sector. As far back as 
1795, Colquhoun’s report Observations and Facts Relative to Public Houses critiqued the dominance 
of the tied model, with large regional brewers “actively engaged in buying up properties which they 
then rented back to tenant landlords”.20 Indeed, disputes over tied leases were emerging in the civil 
courts with some frequency from the late 18th century onwards. A particular concern for tied publicans 
was being forced to buy beer through the tie that was stale or of poor quality. In Holcombe v Hewson21 
the publican argued successfully that he should be able to break free of the tie in his lease as the beer 
supplied was so “very bad” that “he had lost almost the whole of his customers”.22 What is striking 
about these decisions is the Judges’ clear criticism, even at this early stage, of the impact of tied leases 
on their tenants. This is perhaps best illustrated in Thornton and Others v Sherratt23 – another case 
 
15 Institute of Public Policy Research, ‘Tied Down: The Beer Tie and Its Impact on Britain’s Pubs’ (2011) at: 
https://tinyurl.com/yaafx9rp [accessed 29th June 2021]. 
16 Higgins et al, above n 14. 
17 See Article 101(3) TFEU on the justification of restrictive agreements and Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty. For an analysis of restrictions with respect to beer ties (in advance of the Pubs Code Regulations 
2016/790), see: Punch Taverns (PTL) Ltd v Moses [2006] EWHC 599 (Ch). 
18 E. Macpherson, An examination of the competitiveness of the methods by which beer has been distributed in 
the UK focusing on the beer tie agreement (University of Glasgow 2015) pp. 85-86. Citing Bass [1999] OJ 
L186/1. 
19 See, in particular, CAMRA’s questioning to the Pubs Code Adjudicator – and his written response – from 
November 2019: Pubs Code Adjudicator, ‘PCA response to questions from CAMRA National Executive’ 
(2019) at https://tinyurl.com/y9a4vrc3 [accessed 29th June 2021] at 3. 
20 J Nicholls, The Politics of Alcohol (Manchester University Press 2009) p 85. 
21 (1810) 170 E.R. 1194 
22 Ibid at 392. 
23 (1818) 129 E.R. 488 
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where a publican was sold “stale” beer under the tie.24 In his judgment, Chief Justice Robert Dallas 
underscores that he “very much disapprove[s] of these covenants by which the brewer gets the publican 
into his power”,25 and Justice Burrough concurs, stating that the “contracts by which brewers bind 
publicans to deal with them are not to be favoured” as they are “very prejudicial to the health of the 
subject.”26 
 
The current market is scarred by a series of failed regulatory interventions attempting to tackle the 
problem. Perhaps most infamously, the Beerhouse Act 1830 (known variously as just the “Beer Act”) 
was failed attempt to crush the monopoly of a heavily vertically integrated beer sector. Indeed, Yeomans 
suggests “its very name became synonymous with regulatory failure”.27 Mindful of the concerns of 
Colquhoun’s report and the stronghold on the beer sector by powerful regional brewers, legislators 
sought to open access to what had traditionally been both a restrictive licensing system for pub operators 
and a hard-to-access brewing market for new entrants. As Nicholls highlights, this laissez faire 
intervention in the brewing industry was in vogue, with contemporaries noting that “it was an obsession 
of every enlightened legislator” between 1820 and 1830 that “cheapness and good quality could only 
be secured by an absolutely unrestricted competition”.28 The resulting Beerhouse Act 1830 removed 
the requirement for a licence granted by magistrates altogether for those seeking to sell beer and cider. 
Now, for a small annual fee of two guineas, anyone could brew beer and sell it from their homes.29 
Within 6 months of the Act coming into force, over 24,000 beer shops had opened under the new 
provisions joining 51,000 premises that were already licensed. This rose to 46,000 additional venues by 
1838, effectively doubling the number of places across England and Wales to drink beer.30 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this led to moral outrage among the ruling classes who considered that these reforms 
had “touched off an irreversible course of working-class drunkenness”.31 The regulatory experiment 
was short-lived and in 1869 magistrates were brought back to preside over the licensing of 
establishments under the Wine and Beerhouse Act 1869, with restrictive supply – and associated 
vertical integration by the brewers, delivered through tied leases – strengthening. 
What followed were a series of failed attempts to pass legislation to address the prevalence of tied 
arrangements within the pub sector. Evidence presented to the Royal Commission on Licensing for 
 
24 Ibid at 529. 
25 Ibid at 530. 
26 Ibid at 531. 
27 H Yeomans, Alcohol and Moral Regulation: Public Attitudes, Spirited Measures and Victorian Hangovers 
(Policy Press 2014) p 57. 
28 Nicholls, above n 20, p 90. 
29 N Mason, ‘”The Sovereign People are in a Beastly State”: The Beer Act of 1830 and Victorian Discourse on 
Working-Class Drunkenness’ (2001) 29(1) Victorian Literature and Culture, 109-127, p 109. 
30 Ibid p 113. 
31 Ibid p 110. 
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England and Wales from 1929-1931 – a time when around 90% of public houses were tied32 – is 
particularly instructive of the concerns. Tied-tenants providing evidence in front of the committee spoke 
of the brewers and tied-tenant relationship as akin to “a tyrannical master and a very helpless servant”, 
as tied-tenants shouldering “all the work and all the worry, and the brewers the profit”,33 and – most 
colourfully –  one described the “brewer as an ‘octopus squeezing the life out of the licensee.’”34 The 
Commission decided against recommending abolition of the tie, echoing evidence from one brewer that 
it is “far too deeply rooted to permit any hope of its abolition” and another, that the practice is 
“inevitable.”35 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s reluctance for legislative reform, the early 20th Century is littered 
with unsuccessful Bills seeking to abolish or constrain tied arrangements. Most notably, the Tied 
Houses (Freeing) Bill in 1902 and the Tied Houses (Abolition) Bill 1906 were (unsuccessfully) 
introduced to the House of Commons in an attempt to prevent breweries holding alcohol licenses on 
behalf of their tenants.36 Unperturbed, the Licensing Law Reform League continued to argue for a 
Freeing of Tied Houses Bill until the 1940s.37 These unsuccessful legislative attempts were 
accompanied by equally unsuccessful legal action. The enforceability of lease covenants imposing the 
tie were challenged routinely within the courts across the course of the late 19th and early 20th century 
as the sector boomed, and were as routinely upheld.38 Indeed, in their analysis of an unreported 
challenge in Mablethorpe Hotels Ltd v Home Brewery Cod Ltd in 1937, the Brewing Trade Review 
lamented that “the validity of tying covenants has never been seriously questioned” by the courts, with 
the judgment in Mablethorpe “showing how well-established that validity is”.39 
This status quo was left largely untouched until the so-called “Beer Orders” of the late 1980s: the Supply 
of Beer (Loan Ties, Licensed Premises and Wholesale Prices) Order 1989/2258, and the Supply of Beer 
(Tied Estate) Order 1989/2390. As Nicholl’s argues, these instruments were motivated by strikingly 
parallel concerns to the Beerhouse Act 1830.40 By the 1960s, control of UK brewing and the pub stock 
by the largest six breweries had become difficult to ignore. More than 80% of the UK pub sector was 
under direct brewery control, and 97% of beer produced in the UK was sold in outlets owned by the 
brewers themselves.41 This led to a sustained interest by regulators and competition authorities in the 
wake of the Second World War, starting with a refusal to grant an increase in prices by the National 
 
32 Royal Commission on Licensing for England and Wales, (1929-1931) (HO 73/125) at 4. 
33 Ibid at 25. 
34 Ibid at 26. 
35 Ibid at 212. 
36 Tied Houses (Abolition) Bill 1901 (HO 45/10202/B32509). 
37 Liquor Licensing: Tied Houses, 1907-1947 (HO 45/20822). 
38 See for instance, Charrington & Co Ltd v Wooder [1914] A.C. 71 and Clegg v Hands (1890) 44 Ch. D. 503. 
39 ‘Mablethorpe Hotels Ltd. v Home Brewery Co. Ltd’ (3rd June 1937) Brewing Trade Review. 
40 Nicholls, above n 20. pp 217-218. 
41 Julie Bower, ‘Vertical and financial ownership: Competition policy and the evolution of the UK pub market’ 
(2016) 58(5) Business History 647-666, p 652. 
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Board for Prices and Incomes42, prompting the first investigation by the Monopolies Commission in 
1969.43 This concluded that, “but for the difficulties of change and transition”, a system not reliant on 
the tie was “preferable” to the current state of affairs.44 Such concerns were soon superseded by a second 
inquiry by the Monopolies Commission in 1989, triggered by report from the Price Commission and a 
reference from the Office for Fair Trading45. They concluded that a complex monopoly existed and 
regulatory action followed in the form of the “Beer Orders”. Among many other interventions, such as 
the requirement to allow operators to carry at least one guest cask-conditioned ale,46 the Orders required 
breweries to reduce their tied estates to 2,000 or fewer licensed premises.47 
The Beer Orders are an example of regulatory unintended consequences par excellence. The main result 
of the policy was a second model of vertical integration based on “PubCos”: financial intermediaries 
and pub-owning companies to whom the breweries’ decanted their tied estates.48 Indeed, although the 
number of tied pubs fell by over 30% as a result of the Beer Orders, as Nicholls argues, that was offset 
“almost precisely” by the rise of PubCo establishments engaging with an ever concentrated brewing 
industry.49 The largest breweries were boasting publicly that they were still retaining over 70% of beer 
sales in pubs that they had divested.50 As Hilton notes, many of the most self-proclaimed “pro-business 
politicians” had inadvertently ushered in a series of unintended consequences that have shaped the 
sector to the detriment of many operators.51 The orders were revoked in 2003, as – in the words of the 
Government at the time – "there is nobody to whom the orders are currently relevant…it is a pointless 
regulation".52 
What emerges, therefore, is a complex beer market with PubCos, independent pubs, and other tied or 
retail chain public houses, all regulated differently. Figure One provides a brief summary of the 
construction of the pub sector as it currently standards, as compared to the beer supply chain of the late 
1980s for pubs subject to the Beer Orders intervention. 
 
42 National Board for Prices and Incomes, Costs, Prices & Profits in the Brewing Industry (Cmnd 2965, 1966) 
43 The Monopolies Commission, Report on the Supply of Beer (Cmnd 216, 1969)  
44 E Macpherson, An examination of the competitiveness of the methods by which beer has been distributed in 
the UK focusing on the beer tie agreement (Thesis, University of Glasgow 2015) pp 27-35.  
45 See Price Commission, Report No.31 Beer Prices and Margins (1977) and ibid, p 30. 
46 Article 7, Supply of Beer (Tied Estate) Order 1989/2390. This was widely considered to be a success, see; 
Alan Cooper, ‘Competition policy for the UK drinks industry: a consistent approach?’ (1996) 17(5) European 
Competition Law Review 295-298, 296. 
47 Art. 2, Supply of Beer (Tied Estate) Order 1989/2390. 
48 Higgins et al, above 14. p  668. 
49 Nicholls, above n 20. p 220. 
50 J Spicer, C Thurman, J Walters and S Ward, Intervention in the Modern UK Brewing Industry (Palgrave 
2012) p 141. 
51 Ibid, xii. 
52 Select Committee on Trade and Industry, Second Report: Session 2004-05 (2004). Available: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmtrdind/128/12802.htm [accessed 29th June 2021]. 
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Clearly, the concern of this paper – the PCA and the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 – can only be 
understood alongside these changes in the beer and pub market and the consequences of previous failed 
attempts at regulatory intervention. Indeed, PubCos themselves are a creature of unforeseen 
consequences of the Beer Orders of the late 1980s. Having established this important context, the next 
section moves to the development of the PCA model itself. 
b. The origins of the Pubs Code Adjudicator Model 
As a result of these industry shifts, the focus of the debate has moved from anti-competitive practices 
by the breweries to those of the newly formed PubCos. There were a wide-range of complaints by tied-
tenants: that the cost of beer (the “wet” rent) was too high; broader-ranging exclusive purchasing 
agreements were anti-competitive; and PubCo support – particularly given the high combined costs of 
the “wet” and “dry” rent, was left wanting.54 Concerns led to no fewer than four inquiries between 2004 
and 2010 by the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee (also under its various guises of the 
“Trade and Industry Select Committee” and the “Business and Enterprise Select Committee”).  
The committee made a series of increasingly robust calls for reform in the sector. These focused chiefly 
on the recommendation that the Government should consider how best to secure a “free of tie” 
opportunity for tied-tenants.55 The solution adopted until 2013 was to push the industry to self-regulate, 
with the Government noting that: “legally binging self-regulation can be introduced far more quickly 
than a statutory solution and can, if devised correctly, be equally effective”.56 However, in light of the 
 
53 Ibid.  
54 Spicer et al, above n 50. p 210. 
55 Ibid p 215. 
56 Macpherson, above n 18. p 134 
Beer supply chain in 1989 Beer supply chain in 2004 
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same problems persisting, patience soon ran out. As the Business, Innovation and Skills Select 
Committee warned in 2010: 
The industry must be aware that this is the last opportunity for self-regulated reform. 
If it cannot deliver this time, then Government intervention will be necessary.57 
By 2013, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, had concluded that regulation was necessary. He 
consulted on the establishment of a statutory code presided over by an Adjudicator who possessed 
regulatory powers, based on the same model as the recently formed “Groceries Code Adjudicator”.58 
Is in the context of this long, sustained regulatory scrutiny of this tied pub model that the mechanisms 
within the next section should be understood. 
2. MECHANISMS IN THE PUBS CODE REGULATIONS 2016 
The raison d’etre of the underpinning Pubs Codes is founded in two animating principles specified in 
Part IV of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. The design of the underpinning 
Pubs Code Regulations 2016 stem from s.42(3), which requires that the Code and the function of the 
PCA is consistent with: 
(a)  the principle of fair and lawful dealing by pub-owning businesses in relation to 
their tied pub tenants; 
(b)  the principle that tied pub tenants should not be worse off than they would be if 
they were not subject to any product or service tie. 
These two principles are returned to frequently in both the Pubs Codes themselves and in decisions by 
the adjudicator in arbitrations. As the Pubs Adjudicator puts it in Edward Anderson v Marstons PLC59: 
All of the issues in the case should be considered in the light of the overriding 
principles found in section 42 of the 2015 Act because they are the starting point to 
understanding the Pubs Code and the statute that enabled it…The core Code 
principles are at the heart of the statutory purpose behind the establishment of the 
Pubs Code regime… 
The Pubs Code is enacted under these principles, taking shape through The Pubs Code etc Regulations 
2016 and The Pubs Code (Fees, Costs and Financial Penalties) Regulations 2016. These regulations 
apply to pub-owning companies with more than 500 pubs in their estate – currently six PubCos and at 
 
57 Spicer et al, above n 50. p 218. 
58 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Pub Companies and tenants: a Government Consultation (22nd 
April 2013) at para 3.9, p 12. 
59(Pubs Code Arbitration) (2019) (ARB/000322/ANDERSON5) at: https://tinyurl.com/rflcmot [accessed 7th 
June 2020]. 
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least 11,500 tied pub tenants in total.60 As far as the adjudicator’s dispute settlement role is concerned, 
the regime is a creature of statutory arbitration and falls under the framework outlined in s.94 Arbitration 
Act 1996. There are two key mechanisms for tenants in the Code – those to break free of tie and those 
handing the review of rent – which are accompanied by the PCA’s regulatory function. Each are dealt 
with in turn. 
a. Breaking free of the tie: the Market-Rent Only escape 
The so-called “market rent only” (MRO) offer is the flagship intervention in the Pubs Code, designed 
to underpin the Pubs Code principles.61 It provides a statutory right to break free of a tied arrangement 
and simply pay a market rent for the property, without the obligations of the “wet rent” in the form of 
stocking requirements and arrangements of exclusive supply. By providing this final back-stop, the 
principle is that tied-tenants can better negotiate their current tied-agreements and – should they be 
dissatisfied with their negotiated tied lease – break free from it altogether. 
In practice, the arrangements are complex and have been marred by problems with dispute resolution 
practices that we return to below. The “MRO offer” process is only “triggered” in a set of finite 
circumstances, such as the renewal of a lease or a rent assessment.62 At which point, the PubCo must 
provide a compliant “MRO offer” to the tied-tenant. This must be a lease that “does not contain any 
product or service tie” (with the exception of insurance arrangements), and “does not contain any 
unreasonable terms or conditions”.63 The only other requirements are detailed in Regulations 30 and 31 
of the Pubs Code, which specify terms that are required in the proposed tenancy (e.g. that it is for a 
period at least as long as the remaining term of the existing tenancy), and when terms would be 
considered unreasonable (e.g. that they are terms which are which are not common terms in agreements 
between landlords and pub tenants who are not subject to product or service ties). 
What emerges, therefore, is a mechanism for tied-tenants to receive a “MRO” lease – notionally 
designed to mirror free-of-tie leases – in response to certain trigger events, with a wide discretion 
afforded to both the PubCo and the PCA in determining the compliance of such offers. The only 
organising concept that the Pubs Code supplies is that of “reasonableness”: both in broad terms within 
s.43(4) of the 2015 Act, and in determining those “terms which are not common terms in agreements 
between landlords and pub tenants who are not subject to product or service ties” under Reg.31(2)(c) 
Pubs Code Etc Regulations 2016. 
 
60 HC Deb, 24 January 2018, c174WH. 
61 See s.43 Small Business, Enterprise, and Employment Act 2015 and Parts 5-8 Pubs Code Etc Regulations 
2016/790. 
62 Where there are significant increases to tied products or services, the receipt of a rent assessment, the renewal 
of the lease and/or a foreseeable significant impact on trade at the pub that is “unlikely to affect all pubs in 
England or Wales.” See, inter alia,  reg.7 Pubs Code Etc Regulations 2016/270 and s.43 Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
63 S.43(5) Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
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b. David and Goliath: Information asymmetry and rent reviews 
Although the MRO process provides (at least in principle) the option to break away from tied 
arrangements for tenants, to help ensure the principle of “fair and lawful dealing by pub-owning 
businesses in relation to their tied pub tenants” who remain in tied-leases, the Pubs Code creates a series 
of processes for the review of rent. These are, as the PCA themselves noted, a fundamental part of 
giving effect to the regulations’ “overriding principles”.64 
The “rent assessment” processes under the Pubs Code are effectively process-based duties to disclose 
information in a rent negotiation.65 They are much in the spirit of addressing “asymmetries of 
information” market failures that can characterise contractual arrangements between parties with 
inherently imbalanced powers and access to expertise.66 In their nature as large-scale property owning 
businesses, PubCos are well-versed in thousands of rental negotiations and will have access to specialist 
in-house advice and the resources to secure outside consultancy. In comparison, the tied tenant has far 
fewer resources and is likely to have little or no experience negotiating rent for other leases; especially 
for relatively new entrants into the sector. 
Fundamentally, the regulations require that any rent assessment is completed in accordance with Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors’ guidance and be accompanied by written confirmation from a 
chartered surveyor to confirm this.67 The relevant guidance details, in broad terms, the process of 
calculating the fair maintainable operating turnover and profit that defines the approach to determining 
tied-pub “dry rent” detailed above.68  
Over-and-above this requirement however, the information sharing requirements on the PubCo are 
extensive. Laid out in Schedule Two of the 2016 regulations, they detail the provision of key 
information to inform negotiations over rent – such as the PubCo disclosing the method used to calculate 
the rental offer and providing a fully itemised profit/loss account. Table One provides a summary of 
these: paragraphs five to ten of the schedule all introduce requirements for the profit/loss forecast, and 
the remaining paragraphs introduce other free-standing requirements to disclose information (e.g. 
providing a list of relevant and irrelevant matters for the negotiations).  
  
 
64 Edward Anderson v Marstons PLC (Pubs Code Arbitration) (2019) (ARB/000322/ANDERSON5) Available: 
https://tinyurl.com/rflcmot [accessed 29th June 2021] at 22. 
65 M De Hoon, ‘Power Imbalances in Contracts: An Interdisciplinary Study on Effects of Intervention’ (2007) 
Tilburg University Legal Studies Working Paper. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985875 [accessed 29th June 2021], pp 6-8. 
66 H Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP 1999) p 280. 
67 For rent proposals, see Reg.16(3), and for rent assessments see Reg.20(3) Pubs Code Etc Regulations 
2016/790. 
68 See The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, The capital and rental valuation of public houses, bars, 
restaurants and nightclubs in England and Wales (2010). Available: https://tinyurl.com/y48k2pzc [accessed 
29th June 2021]. 
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Table One: A summary of the specified information detailed in Schedule Two Pubs Code Regulations 
2016 
Requirements imposed under Sch.2 Pubs Code Regulations 2016 
Free-standing information requirements Requirements tied to the profit and loss forecast 
Paragraph Summary Paragraph Summary 
One 
The method used to calculate the 
rent, inc. justifications for the 
sources of information used. 
Five 
An itemised profit and loss forecast 
for the first 12 months of the 
forecast rent period. 
Two 
An outline of the procedure to be 
followed during rent negotiations. 
Six 
To provide the figures in para.5 net 
of VAT and games machine taxes. 
Three 
A list of (ir)relevant matters for the 
negotiations. 
Seven 
Any variance between the figures in 
para.5 and publicly available costs 
of running a pub must be explained. 
Four 
The cost of service charges for the 
pub over the last three years. 
Eight 
The information provided in para.5 
must be sufficiently 
detailed/explained so that the tenant 
can understand the basis of the 
figures arrived at. 
Eleven 
Any information in respect of 
making an new agreement (outlined 
in Sch.1) – if it hasn’t already been 
provided – should also be provided. 
Nine 
The information under para.5 must 
be accurate (if historical data) and 
reasonable (if projected data). 
Twelve 
A timetable for the negotiation, 
including dates by which any other 
information will be made available 
to the tenant. 
Ten 
Calculations under para.5 must 
detail volume of alcohol in respect 
of which any excise was paid the 
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This focus on the provision of information and transparency of the negotiations is found elsewhere in 
the code. Most notably, for all meetings between the PubCo and the tied tenant, an appointed business 
development manager or representative of the PubCo must make “appropriate notes of any discussions” 
with the tied tenant in relation to negotiations under the Code, including for rent proposals and 
assessments, and provide these to the tied tenant within 14 days.69 Indeed, Marston PLC’s failure to 
provide complete notes of discussions with a tenant (and providing these 9 days late) has been the 
subject of Pubs Code Adjudicator arbitration decision against them.70 
In the course of arbitrations and written guidance from the PCA, these wide-ranging information 
disclosure requirements have been interpreted in line with the “fair and lawful dealing”71 principle at 
the heart of the Pubs Code. This has added two layers of gloss to Schedule Two. First, PubCos must 
disclose the listed documents in a way that is accessible to a tied tenant. As the Pubs Code Adjudicator 
puts it in one such arbitration: 
Consistency with the principle of fair and lawful dealing between a POB and a [tied 
pub tenant] in my view requires that obligations be complied with in a transparent 
and accessible manner, that enables a TPT to access their rights under the Code.72 
It is not enough, therefore, that a PubCo provides the list of information detailed in the schedule: it must 
also be “easily accessible and understood by tenants”.73 Second, PubCos have a wide-ranging duty to 
comply with any “reasonable request” by the tied-tenant to disclose further information under 
Regulation 21(3), or to provide a “reasonable explanation” as to why the information requested cannot 
be provided. It is clear from a series of arbitrations that such a request being “time-consuming” and 
requiring a substantial “financial outlay”, are not sufficient explanation to refuse an otherwise 
reasonable request.74 
c. Referrals to arbitration and appeals 
The basic principle is that any failure by a PubCo to comply with arbitrable provisions of the Pubs Code 
dealing with either of these mechanisms can be referred by the tied-tenant to the PCA for abritration.75 
In common with some other forms of business-to-business dispute resolution (such as with banks),76 
the larger party have more limited rights to refer. Under the Pubs Code, a PubCo can only refer disputes 
 
69 Reg.41(4)(a)-(b) Pubs Code Regulations 2016. For an arbitration clarifying the ambit of this provision, see 
Rob Whitby v Star Pubs and Bars Ltd (2019) ARB/10573 Available at: https://tinyurl.com/3udue257 [accessed 
29th June 2021]. 
70 See Anderson v Marston’s PLC (2018) ARB/000308/ANDERSON4. Available at: 
https://tinyurl.com/y94lydsk [accessed 29th June 2021]. 
71 Ibid at [41]. 
72 Ibid at [53]. 
73 Ibid at [41]. 
74 Stephen Womack v EI Group PLC (2020) ARB/106050/WOMACK at [71]. 
75 See s.48 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
76 Hodges, above n 1. pp 458-460. 
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in relation to the MRO process,77 all other dipsutes can only be referred by the tied-tenant. PubCos 
cannot navigate out the PCA’s involvement in an MRO dispute if the lease agreement between the two 
parties already contains an arbitration clause – in such cases, the tied-tenant can appoint the PCA as the 
arbitrator.78 
Whether abitrated by the PCA themselves (as was common within the first few years of the Code’s 
operation), or by another arbitrator they appoint,79 this is a “statutory arbitration” regulated under s.94 
Arbitration Act 1996. This allows for some limited appeal rights to the High Court where the arbitration 
suffers from a serious irregularity (for instance, the arbtirator failed to deal with all issues put to it, or 
the award is ambigious),80 or on a point of law (for instance, the arbitrator misinterpreted the provisions 
of the Pubs Code Regulations 2016).81 Both have been grounds for a series of appeals returned to 
below.82 
3. REGULATORY POWERS IN THE CODE ADJUDICATOR MODEL 
The other side of the PCA’s Janus-face their regulatory responsibility. This is a broad-ranging set of 
investigatory and enforcement powers conferred by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 
Act 2015.83 Wherever the PCA has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that a PubCo has not complied with 
the Code, they can trigger a wide-ranging investigative power, including the ability to enforce the 
disclosure of documents from a PubCo.84 For PubCos found to have breached the code, the PCA has 
the power to issue considerable fines of up to 1% of the PubCo’s turnover, make binding 
recommendations for improvements, or require the publication of information.85 For the largest PubCos 
– such as EiGroup, with a turnover in 2018/19 of £724 million86 – the potential fines are considerable. 
In guidance issued by the Pubs Code Adjudicator, they refer broadly to adopting the “Macroy 
principles” in the assessment of any such penalty: broadly, using sanctions proportionally to change the 
behavior of the offender and deter future non-compliance.87 
At the time of writing, there has been one such investigation triggered by the PCA. This launched three 
years after the introduction of the Pubs Code in July 2019 and focused on the routine adoption of non-
 
77 Regulation 60, Pubs Code. 
78 Regulation 60(2), Pubs Code. 
79 S.48(5) Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
80 S.68 Arbitration Act 1996. 
81 S.69 Arbitration Act 1996. 
82 Star Pubs & Bars Ltd v McGrath [2021] EWHC 1640 (Ch); Ei Group Plc v Clarke [2020] EWHC 1858 (Ch);  
Punch Partnerships (PTL) Ltd v Jonalt Ltd [2020] EWHC 1376 (Ch); Punch Parterships (Ptl) Ltd v 
Highwayman Hotel (Kidlington) Ltd [2020] EWHC 714 (Ch). 
83 See ss.53-59 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
84 See Para.19 Schedule One, Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
85 See ss.56-58 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015; the extent of these powers are detailed in 
the subsequent Regs.5-6 The Pubs Code (Fees, Costs and Financial Penalties) Regulations 2016/802. 
86 See Reg.5(1) Pubs Code (Fees, Costs and Financial Penalties) Regulations 2016/802. 
87 R Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (2006). Available: https://tinyurl.com/y7rkzvyo 
[accessed 29th June 2021) at 10. 
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compliant stocking requirements by Star Pubs & Bars Limited. Following a lengthy investigation 
process, the PCA triggered a notice to Star on 14 October 2020 under section 58(2) of the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 to impose a financial penalty of £2 million, noting in 
the investigation that: 
Star must change its mind set, to be proactive in its approach to compliance. This can best 
be achieved through the imposition of a sanction that will serve as a deterrent to future non-
compliant conduct by Star and other POBs.88 
Notwithstanding this significant investigation and resulting fine against Star Pubs & Bars, the PCA has 
recognised that their regulatory function has been neglected in the first few years of the Pubs Code’s 
operation, in favour of a focus on arbitration functions. This is, in part, a function of the PCA’s Janus-
face – arbitration decisions were used routinely for clarifying aspects of the code. In their response to 
the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s review, the PCA themselves noted how 
their “dual statutory functions have frequently exerted pressures on each other.”89 They have signaled 
their intention to “mov[e] decisively” away from managing individual arbitrations, and instead to focus 
on “regulatory interventions to increase the pace of behavioural and cultural change and to embed 
compliance.”90 The PCA’s regulatory role has also suffered from a lack of clarity on the meaning of 
some aspects of the underpinning Pubs Code regulations. Indeed, as the PCA notes themselves in 
response to the statutory review, “it is highly unusual for the regulator to have to make decisions on 
what the law means ahead of taking regulatory action on that law.”91  
Similar tensions arise when information gained through their regulatory function bites on ongoing 
arbitrations. This was the issue before the court in Highwayman.92 Here, a document attained from Star 
Pubs and Bars Ltd in the course of the PCA’s regulatory work – a 10-year lease policy on MRO 
responses – was forwarded by the PCA to a tied-tenant engaged in an ongoing arbitration with the 
company. Star Pubs and Bars Ltd objected to the document disclosed in the PCA’s regulatory function 
being forwarded without their permission to a tied-tenant engaged in its arbitration function.93 Although 
 
88 Pubs Code Adjudicator, ‘Investigation into Star Pubs & Bars Limited’ (2020). Available: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/926755/PCA_
report_of_investigation_into_Star_Pubs___Bars_Limited.pdf  [accessed 29th June 2021) p 35. 
89 Pubs Code Adjudicator, ‘PCA response to BEIS Pubs Code statutory review’ (2019). Available: 
https://tinyurl.com/y8rpab87 [accessed 29th June 2021] at 11. 
90 Pubs Code Adjudicator, ‘PCA response to questions from CAMRA National Executive’ (2019) at 
https://tinyurl.com/y9a4vrc3 [accessed 29th June 2021] at 3. 
91 Pubs Code Adjudicator, above n 89. at 11. 
92 Highwayman, above n 82. 
93 Ibid at 23. 
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the case turned on other issues,94 the court noted that this dual-function was built into the Code 
Adjudicator model. The “regulatory and arbitration functions” of the PCA cannot be “chopped apart”.95  
 
4. PROBLEMS WITH THE PUBS CODE ADJUDCIATOR MODEL 
As outlined at the start of this paper, Hodges argues there are two core objectives for any new model of 
dispute resolution: to identify problems and resolve them, and to change future behaviour or systems 
based on problems its users encounter. 96 Having established the problem the PCA and the Pubs Code 
Regulations seek to address and the mechanism intended to resolve them, this section turns to whether 
the introduction of this new intermediary has achieved and whether there is evidence of more systematic 
change.  
 
The analysis below deals with four issues that emerged in our research: (i) delays and cycles of 
arbitration, (ii) the small number of MRO leases agreed, (iii) the burden of proof, and (iv) interaction 
with the tied-tenants’ prior legal relationship with the PubCo. In the course of this analysis we draw on 
interview and arbitration data. The former is based on fourteen anonymous semi-structured interviews 
with tenants who have engaged with the MRO procedure. Participants where recruited via stakeholders 
who provide advice on the exercise of Pubs Code rights in the pub sector – each interview was 
conducted over Zoom across May to June 2021, and the audio subsequently transcribed and analysed. 
The study received ethical permission from the University of York Economics, Law, Management, 
Sociology and Politics Ethics Committee. The latter is based on a sample of 43 PCA arbitration 
decisions published on the PCA Government website and four appeals under s.68 and s.69 Arbitration 
Act 1996.97 These cover both the MRO and rent assessment mechanisms above.  
  
a. Delays and cycles of arbitration 
As Hodges argues, the time taken to resolve a dispute is “an important key performance indicator” of 
any dispute resolution model.98 This is especially true in instances where there are inherent resource 
imbalances between the involved parties. Here, protracted processes and delays can disproportionately 
deplete the resources of the smaller party, which in turn provides an incentive for the larger party to 
game the system. The literature on international arbitration points to delay as a “guerrilla tactic” in 
 
94 See J Meers, ‘Constraining the power of the Pubs Code Adjudicator: Imposing terms on a “market rent only” 
offer’(2020) 24(4) L. & T. Review, 144-149. 
95 Highwayman, above n 82. at 83. 
96 Ibid p 29. 
97 Star Pubs & Bars Ltd v McGrath [2021] EWHC 1640 (Ch); Ei Group Plc v Clarke [2020] EWHC 1858 (Ch);  
Punch Partnerships (PTL) Ltd v Jonalt Ltd [2020] EWHC 1376 (Ch); Punch Parterships (Ptl) Ltd v 
Highwayman Hotel (Kidlington) Ltd [2020] EWHC 714 (Ch). 
98 Hodges, above n 1, p 29. 
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arbitration proceedings – particularly in the context of case management processes99 – and the 
importance of ensuring that control of arbitration processes are not “skewed in favor of one party.”100 
The tactical use of delay is a particularly acute problem for the Pubs Code. Its raison d’etre is to address 
the considerable power and resource imbalances between unequal parties, as reflected in one of its 
underpinning statutory aims to ensure “fair and lawful dealing by pub-owning businesses in relation to 
their tied pub tenants”.101 The use of delay to deplete resources or make the arbitration less appealing 
could in turn render Code rights entirely illusory. However, contributors to the Government’s statutory 
review of the Pubs Code pointed to problems with the length of the process between triggering an MRO 
right and a negotiated outcome, leading both to the costs associated with arbitration and the “delay in 
seeing the benefits of a new tied agreement or MRO.”102 Data on MRO processes in Figure Two shows 
that there are considerable variations between PubCos, with a median of 164 days from triggering the 
process to an outcome. However, particularly for Ei Group and Greene King, it is not usual for this 
period to be far longer, with median timescales of 226 and 237 days respectively. 
  
 
99 P Halprin, ‘Resisting Guerrilla Tactics in International Arbitration’ (2019) 85(1) Arbitration: The 
International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 87-97. 
100 A Abwunza, T Peter and K Muigua, ‘Explaining Delays in Construction Arbitration: A Process-Control 
Model Approach’ (2020) 12(2) Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and 
Construction. 
101 S.42(3) Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
102 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Statutory Review of the Pubs Code and the Pubs 
Code Adjudicator: 2016-2019’ (2020). Available: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/932249/Repor
t_on_the_statutory_review_of_the_Pubs_Code_and_PCA_2016_to_2019.pdf [accessed 29th June 2021] p 38. 





There are structural reasons within the Pubs Code which may exacerbate these delays. Principally the 
power of an arbitrator to direct the inclusion of specific terms within an MRO lease. This was the focus 
of a referral to the High Court under s.69 Arbitration Act 1996 in Punch Partnerships v Highwayman 
Hotel103, in which the court considered whether an arbitrator could direct a particular term – in this case, 
a specific lease length – into an MRO offer in order to avoid protracted litigation between the parties. 
At the initial arbitration, the PubCo had argued that the power of the arbitrator (in this case, the PCA 
themselves) under regulation 33(2) of the Pubs Code Regulations 2016, only allowed them to direct a 
revised MRO response: not to specify what terms should be included in such a response. In the original 
arbitration, the PCA noted that: 
 
103 [2020] EWHC 714 (Ch))  
Figure Two: A box-plot illustrating the average delay average delay between MRO applications and 
outcomes between 1st July 2017 to 1st January 2020. Raw data available via the BBPA. Interactive version 
available at: https://tinyurl.com/y7kph4e9. 
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“[The PubCo’s] interpretation of my powers under regulation 33(2) is such as to provide 
the potential for locking a tied pub tenant into a cycle of litigation. Such delay would place 
a greater burden on the tenant than on [the PubCo] as a huge international brand with deep 
pockets."104 
This danger of the revolving door of litigation was noted by the High Court, which accepted that such 
an interpretation of the arbitrator’s powers poses “a risk of further delay, cost and attrition involved in 
repeated offers and arbitration” that “might harm the Tenant more than the [PubCo]”.105 However, 
although the Pubs Code provides the PCA with the power to require a PubCo to issue a revised response, 
they could not determine the terms within that response: that is to be left to the PubCo, and then subject 
– if needed – to further arbitration. The permissive language in reg.33 was not enough to “empower the 
arbitrator to interfere with the economic and property interests of the parties”; for the court to be 
satisfied that such a power exists, it needed to be more clearly expressed in the underpinning 
legislation.106 
The problem of delay was raised routinely by participants in our sample – always negatively. A majority 
considered that delay was used as part of a PubCo’s efforts to make the process more difficult for tied-
tenants and/or to encourage them to remain tied. As one participant put it: 
It gets to the point that with every communication they stretch it to the limit of when 
they have to reply, so if you add all of them communications up – even when you 
ring them, it’s ‘oh, I’ll get back to you’… the delaying tactics are just prevalent 
throughout.107 
This is particularly acute for the majority of tied tenants opting for legal representation given the 
complexities of the code and of commercial leasehold law more generally. Especially for operators 
with multiple sites, delays can quickly lead to very expensive legal fees: 
I didn’t achieve MRO on any of my sites – not one – my legal fees came to over 
£100,000, which just makes me shudder at the thought of it now. And I lost all of 
my pubs…with them being taken back into managed houses.108 
These additional costs are not limited to engagement with the MRO process (such as of representation) 
and of uncertainty, but also because new free-of-tie arrangements are not back-dated under the 
 
104 Punch Partnerships (Ptl) Ltd v Highwayman Hotel (Kidlington) Ltd [2020] EWHC 714 (Ch)) at [28]. 
105 Highwayman, above n 82, at [107]. 
106 Ibid at [102]. 
107 Participant One. 
108 Participant Seven. 
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legislation. If there is a delay to reaching a free-of-tie agreement, rent differentials are not back-dated 
to the point of the MRO trigger. As one participant put it: 
Nothing is back-dated, so every time anything is slowed down by the PubCo or the 
PCA – both of which were very good at that – then I lost out financially, and every 
time I stuck to a principle I knew it would take years and cost me loads of money. 
So all the incentive is there just to continue tied.109 
Both the arbitration and interview data therefore illustrate that delay – and the possible use of delaying 
tactics – are a particularly acute issue in the first years of the Pubs Code’s operation. 
b. Arbitration outcomes 
The delays between MRO application and outcome outlined at (a) above, should be read alongside the 
data on arbitration outcomes – what do parties agree at the end of the statutory arbitration process? 
Figure Three details the outcomes that follow the triggering of the MRO mechanism, broken down by 
year and quarter. These data show that, notwithstanding the MRO option is the Pubs Code’s flagship 
intervention, these free-of-tie arrangements are relatively rare. Nearly half of outcomes are tenants 
entering into new tied arrangements with the PubCo (457 by variation to their current lease or 66 via a 
new lease). Whereas free-of-tie arrangements accounted for 129 outcomes over the same period – 
significantly lower, even, than the number of MRO notices rejected (218 in total). The Pubs Code can 
hardly be described, therefore, as a wholesale transfer of tied-leases to free-of-tie leases. 
  
 
109 Participant Two. 



















There are two ways of interpreting these data. First, it may illustrate that the code itself is working. By 
exerting an effect on negotiations between tied parties, even if they may not conclude with tenants 
exercising their statutory right to a free-of-tie arrangement, the MRO process may in turn be improving 
the state of tied leases. Put another way, the potential for going free-of-tie leads the PubCo to improve 
the terms of existing tied leases, for instance by including more options to buy outside of the tie, 
particularly for cask beer. However, it may also illustrate limitations within the regulations. For 
instance, the tight 14-day referral windows within the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 may in turn be 
insufficient to support adequate negotiations between the parties.110 Within our interview data, the tied 
referral windows did emerge as a key barrier for tenants seeking PCA arbitration involvement. This was 
particularly in the context of concerns over missing key dates laid out within the legislation: 
One of the things that started scaring me was that there were what seem to be very 
restrictive timelines, during which you must complete certain factors, certain parts 
 
110 See Reg. 37(9) and Reg. 38(4) Pubs Code Regulations 2016. 
Figure Three: Outcomes following an MRO request from the introduction of the Pubs Code Regulations 
2016 to the end of 2020. Raw data available via the BBPA. Interactive version available at: 
https://tinyurl.com/n6v3bjzw. 
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of it, which I personally feel are not highlighted enough, and not brought to your 
attention, like “you must do this”.111 
The MRO data therefore suggests that reforms to referral windows for tied-tenants looking to dispute 
an MRO offer – laid out within Reg.37 and Reg. 38 of the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 – would likely 
support tied-tenants in their negotiations with a PubCo following an MRO trigger; especially for those 
without resources for full legal representation. 
As our research took place in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is clear that differential support 
offered to tied-tenants and under free-of-tie leases were also an important factor for participants. One 
participant had received an MRO offer that they were keen to accept, however, they were concerned 
that the PubCo would not offer any rent discounts or support while the pub was closed, something they 
have done for tied-tenants. As the participant put it:  
I just couldn’t afford taking the risk with COVID-19…I thought, what if I say yes? 
What if I sign this tomorrow? I’d be paying £100,000 a year rent, with no income. 
I can’t do that. There’s only so many £2,000 a week I’ve got. So I couldn’t have 
done it, I couldn’t have risked it during COVID.112 
Although at the time of writing available MRO data only runs to the end of 2020, this may explain why 
Figure Two illustrates that free-of-tie arrangements are even lower as a proportion of outcomes than 
from before the pandemic. Indeed, representations from Star Pubs and Bars Ltd in the passing of the 
Tied Pubs (Scotland) Bill113 underscore that rent reductions “show the true partnership nature” of the 
tied-model, whereas similar provision is not provided for free-of-tie tenants.114 
c. Burden of proof 
Ordinarily in arbitration, the burden of proof for a given allegation rests on the party asserting it. Known 
variously as the "actori incumbit probatio" principle (the “actor’s burden of proof”) or “onus probandi 
actori incumbit” principle (“the burden of proof lies on the petitioner”), this is the “general trend” in 
arbitrations and the default starting point for burden of proof disputes that arise in arbitration 
proceedings.115 The burden of proof is a fundamental component in arbitration disputes for two reasons. 
First, it provides a framework for each party’s conduct. As Amaral puts it, the burden of proof “works 
 
111 Participant Three. 
112 Participant Four. 
113 Now the Tied Pubs (Scotland) Act 2021, this legislation seeks to replicate aspects of the PCA model in 
Scotland. 
114 See Star Pubs and Bars Ltd, ‘Tied Pubs Scotland Bill at Stage 2’ (2021) Available at: 
https://archive2021.parliament.scot/S5_EconomyJobsFairWork/Inquiries/20210121-Star_Pubs_Bars.pdf 
[accessed 29th June 2021]. 
115 G Amaral, ‘Burden of Proof and Adverse Inferences in International Arbitration: Proposal for an Inference 
Chart’ (2018) 35(1) Journal of International Arbitration 1-30. 
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as a vector for the parties’ action concerning the production of evidence”.116 The extent of obligations 
to produce evidence in turn affects what parties can claim and dispute in the course of arbitration 
proceedings. Second, it provides a means for the arbitrator to take a decision in absence of evidence, or 
as Amaral describes it, the burden of proof “offers a way out whenever relevant evidence is missing”.117 
However, in the UK, the operation of the burden of proof standard is far from fixed to this default 
standard. The Arbitration Act 1996 confers wide-ranging powers for an arbitrator to “rule their own 
evidence”, subject only to appeal based on a serious irregularity.118 Where there is a “marked 
asymmetric relationship” between the parties affecting the “the equality of arms”, a different approach 
may be justified.119 This is particularly true in instances where the burden of proof for one party cannot 
be discharged without evidence that only the opposing party has access to, or the resources to attain.120 
The burden of proof is a key concern in the discharge of arbitration functions by the PCA, particularly 
in terms of the MRO mechanism outlined above. Where does the burden of proof lie in determining 
whether an MRO-offer is compliant with the Pubs Code: with the PubCo making the offer, or the tied-
tenant contesting its validity? This question was considered by the High Court in Jonalt. Here, the 
PubCo had proposed a “stocking requirement”121 in their MRO offer requiring the tied-tenant to stock 
“at least 60%” of their brands, here Heineken products. The tied-tenant argued that this stocking 
requirement was unreasonable and counter-offered a 20% threshold. The arbitrator considered that the 
onus was on the PubCo to demonstrate that their offer was reasonable and – as they had failed to do so 
– directed the inclusion of the 20% threshold in the MRO lease offer. 
On appeal, the High Court determined that “on the normal rules of the burden of proof, the onus lay on 
the tenant to establish the breach alleged”,122 and there was nothing in the Pubs Code to infer 
otherwise.123 Reversing this standard without inviting submissions from the PubCo was a “serious 
irregularity” by the arbitrator under s.68 Arbitration Act 1996.124 This is a significant departure from 
the position of the PCA in a series of arbitrations under the code and seems contrary to the construction 
of the MRO mechanism. The entire animating principle of the MRO offer process is to require a PubCo 
to issue a “compliant” offer to the tied-tenant under s.43(4)(a) Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015. Where such an obligation rests on one party, it is difficult to see how the burden 




118 Under s.68 Arbitration Act 1996. 
119 J Ezurmendia and M Gonzalez, ‘A comparison between the standard of proof applicable in arbitration and 
formal adjudication’ (2021) 25(1) The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 3-15. 
120 Amaral, above n 115. 
121 S. 68(7), Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.  
122 Jonalt, above n 82, at [45]. 
123 Ibid at [46]. 
124 Ibid at [49]-[50], [53]. 
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“[The PubCo] argued that the burden of proof to show a proposal was not compliant lay on the 
tenant who brings the referral for arbitration. However, in the context of this legislation, it is 
the statutory duty of the POB to service a proposal that is compliant, and I understand it 
therefore to be the obligation of the POB to consider what would be compliant in the particular 
case when serving its proposal.”125 
This burden of proof problem is a fundamental issue when designing statutory arbitration systems 
designed to deal with two parties with such inherent power-imbalances. If, as Amaral argues, the burden 
of proof standard in arbitration proceedings serves to frame the conduct of the parties,126 it is surely in 
the interests of the PCA and most consistent with their underpinning statutory aims to ensure that the 
burden of proof for MRO-compliant offers lies with the PubCo. An obligation to provide evidence to 
substantiate this would in turn, be likely to increase the quality of these offers and decrease the costs 
and risks associated with arbitration for tied-tenants. 
d. Interaction with prior legal relationship 
Policymakers and affected PubCos have referred consistently in both the development and ongoing 
operation of the code to potential problems of “unintended consequences”. Indeed, the phrase is 
mentioned on no fewer than five separate occasions within the 2019 statutory review.127 The concerns 
are perhaps best reflected by the British Beer and Pub Association (a trade body representing a number 
of PubCos) post-legislative review submission.128 This highlights a particular concern that the 
introduction of MRO rights may lead to the “unintended consequences” that PubCos begin to convert 
the tied-tenanted pubs, which can avail themselves of Pubs Code rights, into owner-managed pubs, 
where the PubCo simply appoints a salaried manager for the premises and vertical integration is 
maintained.129 
The literature on statutory arbitration has long raised concerns over the interaction between new 
interventions and pre-existing legal arrangements. This critique normally tackles interactions between 
statutory arbitration and common-law doctrine,130 or – as recently argued by Oppong – possible 
conflicts between statutory arbitration and protections afforded to public parties under constitutional 
 
125 Anderson, above n 64. A position also reflected in SPS Pubs Ltd v EI Group Ltd (2018) 
ARB/000103/CLARKE. Available: 
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126 Amaral, above n 115. 
127 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, above n 127, pp. 7, 10, 11, and 39.  
128 British Beer and Pub Association, ‘Submission to the Pubs Code and Pubs Code 
Adjudicator Statutory Review: 2019 the statutory review’ (2019). Available: http://beerandpub.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/Pubs-Code-review-BBPA-response-final-version.pdf [accessed 29th June 2021] p 15. 
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130 W Sturges and R Reckson, ‘Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems Arising from Their 
Coexistence’ (1962) 46 Minnesota Law Review 819-867. 
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law.131 As a statutory intervention concerned with the rights of tied-tenants, the Pubs Code inevitably 
has consequences on the legal relationship between landlord and commercial tenant. In most cases, tied-
tenants benefit from the application of protections in the Landlord & Tenant Act 1954 which, inter alia, 
limit the reasons for which a landlord can refuse the renewal of a lease.132 The MRO rights under the 
Pubs Code are exercised as a distinct process, not as part of lease renewals governed by the 1954 Act: 
the Civil Procedure Rules were amended following the introduction of the Pubs Code to allow the court 
to delay any renewal proceedings pending the outcome of the MRO process.133 
However, important blind spots emerge in the interaction between these two processes. As outlined 
above, one MRO-trigger is the renewal of a tenancy – either following notice from a PubCo,134 or a 
request by the tied-tenant.135 In response, PubCos can issue hostile notices to refuse renewal on the basis 
that they intend to “occupy the holding for the purposes…of a business to be carried on by him 
therein”.136 Such notices allow PubCos to instead transfer properties into their managed estate, 
appointing a salaried management rather than a tenant landlord. This is not without cost to the PubCo. 
Opposing renewal on this ground will require the payment of compensation – perhaps as much as two 
times the ratable value of the property – and can be contested by the tied-tenant by, for instance, 
interrogating the validity of the business plan for such an owner-managed approach.137 However, this 
widespread practice illustrates that the protection of the code can be circumvented via a re-existing and 
largely unreformed legal relationship within the parties. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The PCA and the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 are an historic intervention in the much-maligned tied-
pub sector. They follow a catalogue of failed regulatory attempts to deal with anti-completive practices 
in the pub sector in the UK stretching back to least the early 19th century. In adopting the “code 
adjudicator” model, this new intervention seeks to intervene in the contractual relationship between the 
largest PubCos and their tied tenants. By improving their negotiating power and offering an exit route 
from the tie through access to a MRO tenancy, the quality of tied agreements may in turn improve and 
– should tenants be dissatisfied with current arrangements – they can break free. However, the model 
 
131 R Oppong, ‘The Nature and Constitutionality of Statutorily-Imposed (Non-Contractual) Arbitration in 
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between the two statutes is managed in the Pubs Code, see reg. 26 Pubs Code etc. Regulations 2016/790. 
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also attempts to underpin standards set out in the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 through its regulatory 
mechanisms, enforcing the twin-principles of “fair and lawful dealing by pub-owning businesses in 
relation to their tied pub tenants” and “that tied pub tenants should not be worse off than they would be 
if they were not subject to any product or service tie” that are the raisen d’etre of the PCA laid out 
under their enabling legislation.138 
Drawing on arbitration decisions and appeals, interviews with affected tenants and data on MRO 
outcomes, we have argued that the current operation of the PCA and the Pubs Code Regulations 2016 
falls short of these aims. Some of the problems that emerge are specific to the PCA. Delaying tactics, 
the lack of realization of MRO rights and concerns raised about referral windows, suggests that more 
should be done to reform the arbitration processes and underpinning regulations of the PCA. However, 
other concerns have broader purchase on the “code adjudicator” model. As an intervention into a prior 
contractual relationship, careful consideration should be given for the potential for interactions with 
pre-existing legal rights that could undermine the operation of the code. Moreover, the “burden of 
proof” standard ordinarily applied to arbitration proceedings may not suit aspects of “code adjudicator” 
models that place specific burdens on the larger parties within the underpinning statutory code. 
Returning to Hodge’s characterization of the two core objectives for any new model of dispute 
resolution – to identify problems and resolve them, and to change future behaviour or systems based on 
problems its users encounter139 – our findings suggest that the current operation of the PCA currently 
falls short on both measures. However, notwithstanding these limitations, the “code adjudicator” model 
has exerted a positive effect on the market and shows promise as a form of regulatory intervention. The 
new The Tied Pubs (Scotland) Act 2021 – passed unanimously by the Scottish Parliament on 5th May 
2021 – introduces a parallel system in Scotland, but one which seeks to “avoid problems experienced 
in implementing the 2015 Act in England and Wales”.140 As the underpinning powers, Code and 
operation of Scottish Pubs Code Adjudicator are fleshed out in secondary legislation, comparing their 
success against their English and Welsh counter-part will provide fertile ground not only to explore the 
functioning of the Pubs Code Regulations 2016, but also that of the “code adjudicator” model itself. 
 
138 S. 42(3) Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 2015. 
139 Ibid p 29. 
140 Scottish Parliament, ‘Tied Pubs (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum’ (2020) Available at:  
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